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A New Role for Rollbacks: Showing How Objective Probabilities Undermine the Ability 
to Act Otherwise 
 
Rollback arguments focus on long sequences of actions with identical initial conditions in order 
to explicate the luck problem that indeterminism poses for libertarian free will theories (i.e. the 
problem that indeterministic actions appear arbitrary in a free-will undermining way). In this 
paper, I propose a rollback argument for probability incompatibilism, i.e. for the thesis that free 
will is incompatible with all world-states being governed by objective probabilities. Other than 
the most prominently discussed rollback arguments, this argument explicitly focusses on the 
ability to act otherwise. It argues that the negligible probability of the relative frequencies in 
overall rollback patterns being relevantly different indicates that even the ability to act 
otherwise with regard to individual actions is not free-will enabling. My proposed argument 
provides probability incompatibilists with a tool to argue against a classical event-causal 
response to the luck problem, while it can still motivate an agent-causal response to it. 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper considers rollback versions of the luck problem for libertarianism. Libertarianism in 
the free will debate is the position that free will is incompatible with determinism but that free 
will still exists, which is possible because the world is indeterministic. The luck problem 
threatens this libertarian position by questioning the possibility of free will even in 
indeterministic worlds. 
Libertarians usually claim that free will is incompatible with determinism because 
determinism precludes that an agent can act differently than he actually does. If this is right (as 
I will presuppose in this paper), free will requires indeterminism: at least for some states of the 
world, different concurring later states have to be nomologically possible. Here the luck 
problem arises: If these later states are all possible, isn’t it merely a matter of chance or luck 
which of them turns out to become actualized? If this is the case, arbitrariness threatens to 
undermine free will although the relevant actions are not determined. Accordingly, free will 
appears to be precluded not only by determinism, but also by indeterminism. In order to defend 
libertarianism, one must resist this dilemma and explain how free will can be possible in an 
indeterministic world.  
In this paper, I argue for probability incompatibilism: In order to convincingly overcome 
the luck problem, libertarians must commit to the absence of all-encompassing probabilistic 
natural laws. My argumentative strategy is to show this by developing a version of the luck 
argument which essentially relies on the presupposition that everything is governed by 
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objective probabilities. Should I be successful in arguing that these objective probabilities 
undermine free will, this demonstrates that overcoming the luck problem requires a 
commitment to the absence of all-encompassing objective probabilities. 
Before developing my specific luck argument, the basic threat of luck objections in 
general has to be clarified. Why exactly are undetermined actions supposed to be arbitrary in a 
sense that undermines free will? I will approach this question by considering existing luck 
arguments, the discussion of which will help me to develop my own position. The arguments 
on which I focus are so-called “rollback arguments”, which try to demonstrate the threat of 
indeterminism by considering long sequences of undetermined actions with identical initial 
conditions. 
 I present and discuss three such rollback arguments, namely by Peter van Inwagen 
(2000), Derk Pereboom (2005), and Lászlo Bernáth and János Tőzsér (2020). After identifying 
problems with these arguments, I develop an own rollback argument which is intended to 
overcome these problems. It aims to show that thoroughly probabilistic indeterminism 
precludes free will by undermining the ability to act otherwise. After defending this argument 
against possible objections, I argue that it is able to avoid the earlier identified problems of 
other rollback arguments, as well as of intuition-based luck objections. Finally, I criticise 
Robert Kane’s event-causal response to the luck problem and sketch my own argument’s 
prospects for motivating a more satisfactory agent-causal response. 
 
2. Peter van Inwagen’s Rollback Argument 
The most prominent “rollback argument” against the compatibility of free will and 
indeterminism has been developed by Peter van Inwagen (2000: 13-16). His argument starts 
with the case of an indeterministic action that, from a libertarian perspective, is supposed to be 
(directly1) free due to its indeterminacy: Alice considers whether or not to lie, and how she 
turns out to decide is undetermined at t1. Now it is imagined that as soon as the indeterminacy 
gets settled and Alice either lies or tells the truth, God rolls back the flow of time to t1. As soon 
as the indeterminacy gets settled a second time and Alice performs her respective action, God 
rolls back the flow of time to t1 again, and this procedure gets repeated until there have been a 
thousand rollbacks. 
                                                        
1 What I mean with a directly free action is an action that establishes or increases freedom, rather than merely 
being free due to the freedom of its causal antecedents. For illustration, assume that an agent freely shapes his 
empathetic and helpful character, which later determines that he rescues a wounded animal. In this example, the 
shaping of character is directly free, whereas the animal rescue (determined by the freely-chosen character) is only 
indirectly free. If I discuss requirements for free actions, I always mean requirements for directly free actions 
(unless explicitly stated otherwise). 
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Since Alice’s decision is undetermined, it is not to be expected that she will make the 
same choice in each replay. What composition of lying and truth decisions should be expected 
to occur instead? Van Inwagen (2000: 14) claims that “[a]s the number of ‘replays’ increases, 
we observers shall–almost certainly–observe the ratio of the outcome ‘truth’ to the outcome 
‘lie’ settling down to, converging on, some value.” The relative frequency of ‘truth’ cases, it is 
claimed, should be interpreted as indicating an objective probability of Alice’s telling the truth 
in each individual instance. This way, the rollback scenario is intended to reveal that an 
undetermined action is governed by an objective probability (van Inwagen 2000: 14-15). I will 
call this the probability-establishing step of van Inwagen’s rollback argument. 
So, according to van Inwagen, if Alice makes the undetermined decision to tell the truth, 
this is a matter of objective probability. From this result, van Inwagen (2000: 15-16) 
straightforwardly infers that whether Alice in fact lies or tells the truth is “a mere matter of 
chance” (van Inwagen 2000: 15), rather than an exercise of free will. I will call this second part 
of the rollback argument its freedom-undermining step. Jointly, the probability-establishing 
step, which says that undetermined actions are a matter of objective probability, and the 
freedom-undermining step, which says that probability-governed actions aren’t free, establish 
the rollback argument’s conclusion that undetermined actions are not a matter of free will. 
Van Inwagen’s rollback argument is faced with two main problems. The first problem 
is that the argument itself doesn’t tell us why exactly an action’s being a matter of objective 
probability undermines that action’s freedom.2 Although the freedom-undermining inference 
might seem intuitively plausible, Robert Kane (1999) has argued that just because undetermined 
actions are a matter of “chance” in the technical sense of indeterminism, the freedom-
undermining associations of “chance” in common language (implicating an action’s being 
merely a matter of chance) need not apply to them. Of course, one might disagree with Kane’s 
claim that “chance” in the purely technical sense of indeterminism is not responsibility-
undermining. But even if so, one needs an argument against Kane’s response that van 
Inwagen’s rollback argument itself doesn’t provide (cf. Ginet 2007: 248-249). 
The second criticism has been raised by Lara Buchak (2013), who argues that van 
Inwagen’s rollback arguments involves circularity. To understand her point, let’s again consider 
                                                        
2 Admittedly, the same paper that features van Inwagen’s (2000) rollback argument also contains his independent 
“Promising Argument”, which is intended to support exactly this conclusion. However, since van Inwagen (2011) 
himself concedes severe problems with this latter argument, I am not going to discuss it here. I will also ignore 
van Inwagen’s (2000) “mysterianism”, according to which free will in an indeterministic world is only mysterious 
rather than straightforwardly impossible. Since the rollback argument itself is intended to show the impossibility 
of indeterministic free will, we can easily abstract from whether there is a mysterious undetected flaw in this 
argument. For the sake of simplicity, I choose my formulations as if van Inwagen fully endorsed his own 
argument’s conclusion. 
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van Inwagen’s (2000: 14) assumption in the probability-establishing step of his argument that, 
“[a]s the number of ‘replays’ increases, we observers shall–almost certainly–observe the ratio 
of the outcome ‘truth’ to the outcome ‘lie’ settling down to, converging on, some value.” This 
claim is less innocuous than it might seem at first. Trivially, after any number of replays there 
is some ratio of truth-decisions to lying-decisions. But the quoted passage tries to establish more 
than this, namely that the ratio converges to an ultimate value, which means that, as the number 
of rollbacks increases, the ratio tends to get ever closer and closer to a final ratio. Why should 
we assume this?  
As Buchak (2013: 23-24) points out, the underlying assumption seems to be the statistic 
law of large numbers. Roughly, this law says that if there is a long sequence of independent 
indeterminacy-settlings with the same initial conditions in each instance, then the relative 
frequency of times in which a certain event occurs converges almost certainly to that event’s 
prior probability for each case, as the number of instances approaches to infinity. However, for 
this law to be applicable and thus to yield the expected convergence in a rollback scenario, one 
has to assume that the relevant action is governed by objective prior probabilities. This is a 
problem since what van Inwagen wants to eventually show with the convergence result is just 
the presupposed existence of objective probabilities. The probability-establishing step of the 
rollback argument, that is, involves circularity because it relies on a statistical law that can only 
be applied if one initially assumes the truth of this step’s conclusion anyway.  
Jointly, the two criticisms raised here suffice to cast severe doubt on the usefulness of 
van Inwagen’s rollback argument. The first criticism suggests that the argument’s freedom-
undermining step requires a justification that the rollback argument itself does not provide. In 
principle, this criticism could be overcome if one found a supplementary argument that justifies 
the inference of the freedom-undermining step. But now the second criticism claims that the 
probability-establishing step involves circularity and is thus not warranted either. If the 
probability-establishing step is circular and the freedom-undermining step is unjustified, what 
is the rollback argument good for at all? 
We can certainly avoid Buchak’s circularity charge if we explicitly restrict our 
consideration to cases that involve exceptionless objective probabilities. However, if we thus 
circumvent the probability-establishing step, all that remains from van Inwagen’s argument is 
the freedom-undermining step, which lacks justification. Since reference to the rollback 
sequence can only be found in the probability-establishing step, but not in the freedom-
undermining step, what remains after eliminating the probability-establishing step cannot even 
be appropriately called a “rollback argument” anymore. However, if we found a way to employ 
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the rollback scenario not in the eliminated probability-establishing step, but rather in the 
freedom-undermining step, both of van Inwagen’s problems would be avoided. 
Before discussing rollback arguments that can be interpreted along these lines, it will be 
helpful to outline the difference between an undetermined action and an undetermined action 
with an objective probability. According to van Inwagen, there is no (extensional) difference. 
The probability-establishing part of his rollback argument was just intended to show that if an 
action is undetermined, it has to be a matter of objective probability. In contrast to this, Buchak 
(2013: 24-25) suggests that libertarians can escape van Inwagen’s rollback argument if they 
require (directly) free actions not only to be undetermined, but also to be independent of 
objective probabilities. In such a case, some complete state of the world, conjoined with the 
natural laws, would not only be compatible with different possible states at some later time 
(which is just indeterminism) but, moreover, some states would not even nomologically yield 
a definite probability distribution over the different possibilities for some later time. In this case 
there would be an undetermined action without a definite probability (in respect to the earlier 
time), which illustrates the failure of van Inwagen’s probability-establishing inference (cf. 
Ginet 2007: 244, 249-250). 
Let’s use these thoughts as basis for the following terminology: Indeterminism, as 
explained earlier, holds iff there is some pair of times, such that the complete state of the world 
at the earlier time is nomologically compatible with different possible states at the later time. 
Thoroughly probabilistic indeterminism holds iff, for all these pairs of times, the complete state 
at the earlier time is nomologically sufficient for an exact probability distribution over the 
possibilities for the later time. Iff, for some pair of times, this doesn’t hold, I will speak of 
(partly) lawless indeterminism, because there is some state or event whose probability of 
occurrence remains ungoverned by the laws and the earlier state.3 
The restricted rollback argument that I will develop in this paper doesn’t argue for the 
incompatibility of free will with any indeterminism, but only for the incompatibility of free will 
with thoroughly probabilistic indeterminism. Moreover, it employs the rollback scenario not in 
                                                        
3 The argument of this paper presupposes a (rather commonsensical) propensity interpretation of probabilities, 
according to which probabilities contribute to the grounding of their respective events. For if one adopts a 
concurring frequency interpretation, according to which probabilities merely describe independently existing 
frequencies, free will seems not threatened by probabilities anymore because events can be regarded as “prior” to 
the frequency-probabilities they ground (Ginet 2007: 250). This is similar to the way in which deterministic laws 
don’t seem to threaten free will anymore as soon as a Humean conception of laws is adopted, according to which 
laws do not ground events, but merely describe independently existing regularities (Beebee/Mele 2002; Keil 2007: 
939-942; Tognazzini 2015: 134). I am indebted to Lena Burandt for making me aware of my argument’s 
commitment to a propensity interpretation of probabilities. 
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establishing probabilities, but in arguing for this incompatibility. If the argument is successful, 
it establishes that free will requires (partly) lawless indeterminism. 
 
3. Derk Pereboom’s Rollback Argument 
One of the investigations of Derk Pereboom (2005), who argues for the non-existence of free 
will more generally, becomes relevant here. Against the assumption of a thoroughly 
probabilistic structure of the world, he tries to show why it is “incredible” (Pereboom 2005: 
247) that the control which is required for free will should exist. Since he thereby strongly relies 
on the consideration of a long sequence of undetermined actions with identical initial 
conditions, we can interpret him as presenting a rollback argument for the freedom-
undermining inference.  
 Before this argument can be presented, a few introductory remarks and explanations are 
in order. Firstly, whereas van Inwagen intends his rollback argument to illustrate the luck 
problem for libertarianism, Pereboom (2005: 243-247) has a narrower goal. He accepts the luck 
problem on independent grounds and uses the rollback scenario only to point out a problem that 
the so-called agent-causal response to it faces. Secondly, Pereboom doesn’t want to show that 
thoroughly probabilistic indeterminism is incompatible with the commitments of this agent-
causal approach, but only that these commitments are very unlikely to be warranted given the 
assumption of thoroughly probabilistic indeterminism. 
 Let’s start with defining and motivating the position of agent-causal libertarianism that 
Pereboom wants to argue against. Per definition, libertarianism requires indeterminism. But 
indeterminism is clearly not sufficient for free will. Just because there are some indeterminacies 
in a lifeless system or even in a human brain, there need be no freedom. So, what further 
conditions are required for an undetermined action to be free? Arguably, all plausible free-will 
accounts require that free actions must be caused by their agent in a free-will establishing 
manner (or must at least involve the agent’s appropriately causing certain events).4 The 
difference between event- and agent-causal libertarianism is about whether this required 
causation can be reduced to causation by states and events. Whereas event-causal libertarians 
assume such reducibility, agent-causal libertarians believe that when an agent causes a free 
action (or some other free-will relevant event), the cause is the substance of the agent and the 
causing by the agent-substance is irreducible to causings by the agent’s individual states and 
events. 
                                                        
4 I am neglecting so-called non-causal accounts of free will here (see Clarke/Capes/Swenson 2021: Ch.1; Ginet 
2007). 
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 Why should one claim this irreducibility? Let’s consider the luck problem again (in its 
intuition-based non-rollback form). If an allegedly free action is undetermined by its (directly) 
preceding state, then this earlier state and the natural laws are compatible with alternatives to 
the action in question. The earlier state and the laws do not definitively settle whether the action 
occurs or not. Now, if there is nothing over and above natural laws and states, then there is 
nothing that definitively settles whether the action occurs. This is what suggests that the action 
is arbitrary in a free-will undermining sense (Pereboom 2005: 243).  
The agent-causal libertarian can jump in here and deny that there is nothing over and 
above natural laws and states. According to her, there is an agent whose causal influence cannot 
be reduced to that of states and events. Particularly, she can claim that the agent (as opposed to 
states and events) is not datable, i.e. that he and his decisions are not fixed to specific moments 
in time. So, while earlier states and events leave it in fact open whether the action occurs, the 
agent can be capable of settling this, because there is something about him that is not captured 
by his datable states and events. This allows the irreducible agent to purposively decide 
something that his states and events leave undetermined, such that a free-will enabling form of 
control can be ascribed to him. The event-causal libertarian cannot account for the same kind 
of control because, in the event-causal framework, the causal influence of the agent is reducible 
to that of states and events. States and events, however, are both datable such that they, by the 
definition of indeterminism, have to leave it open whether the undetermined action occurs. So, 
the agent-causal libertarian can claim the she can account for the agent’s control in a way that 
the event-causal libertarian cannot.5 
 Pereboom (2005: 244-245), however, argues that this agent-causal approach is 
unconvincing. In order to do so, he considers an undetermined action that is caused by an 
irreducible agent and is allegedly free due to this agent-causation. For illustration, let’s use the 
example of Alice again. Which ratio of ‘truth’ cases to total cases should we expect to occur in 
a rollback scenario if Alice agent-causes her action? If objective probabilities are present, the 
law of large numbers should let us expect that the relative frequency of ‘truth’ cases will be 
                                                        
5 This is only a rough simplification. In fact, there is a possible escape even for the event-causal libertarian if he 
understands indeterminism as the statement that for some pair of times, the laws and an earlier natural state are 
compatible with different possibilities for the later time’s state. If the event-causal libertarian postulates the 
existence of non-natural states, e.g. the states of a Cartesian soul, he can claim that these non-natural states decide 
in a free-will enabling way what the natural states leave undetermined. However, this approach is arguably less 
attractive than the agent-causal approach because it involves the metaphysically extremely demanding 
commitment that non-natural entities exist and are causally effective. The agent-causal libertarian, on the other 
hand, is not committed to this. The irreducible agent-substance, on her view, might well be completely natural. 
So, strictly speaking, the advantage of agent-causal libertarianism over event-causal libertarianism is not that the 
former can solve a problem that the latter cannot solve, but that it can solve the luck problem in a way that seems 
less metaphysically demanding. In what follows, when I speak of “event-causal libertarianism” I always mean 
those debate-dominating naturalist accounts which don’t rely on the existence of non-natural states. 
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very close to the objective probability p of Alice’s telling the truth (at t1). However, if Alice is 
free to either agent-cause her lying or her telling the truth in each instance, there seems to be 
no reason to expect that the relative frequency will be close to the objective probability, since 
Alice is free in any instance to decide however she wants. From the agent-causal perspective, 
there is no reason to assign a higher probability to the relative frequency being close to p than 
to the relative frequency being close to some other, arbitrary number. Accordingly, if one 
indeed finds the convergence of objective probability and relative frequency (as is to be 
expected from the probability-perspective), this has a very low likelihood on the hypothesis that 
Alice agent-causes her action. Therefore, Pereboom claims, the existence of agent-causation is 
extremely unlikely if there are objective probabilities, and thus one should not believe in it.  
Importantly, Pereboom does not claim the incompatibility of agent-causation with 
thoroughly probabilistic indeterminism. Even under the assumption that there is agent-
causation, it is not impossible to get a ratio very close to p. It is merely that “[t]he proposal that 
agent-caused free choices do not diverge from what the statistical laws predict for the physical 
components of our actions would run so sharply counter to what we would expect as to make 
it incredible” (Pereboom 2005: 245, my emphasis). One might criticise such a mere 
incredibility as not strong enough to demand the rejection of agent-causation from someone 
who is initially completely convinced of its existence. If a piece of evidence (the relative 
frequency of ‘truth’ cases being very close to p) is not incompatible with a hypothesis (that 
Alice agent-causes her actions), but it only has a very low likelihood on this hypothesis, it is 
still logically consistent to accept both the hypothesis and the evidence. In contrast, if one found 
evidence that is logically incompatible with the agent-causal theory, or a deductive argument 
for the conclusion that agent-causation is not given (with premises acceptable to the completely 
convinced defender of agent-causation), even a completely convinced defender of agent-
causation would be rationally required to make at least some changes in his belief system. Such 
an argument would seem superior to Pereboom’s (Bernáth/Tőzsér 2020: 55). 
There is also a second criticism, which concerns the justification of Pereboom’s 
assumption that it is unlikely from the agent-causal perspective to get a ratio (of ‘truth’ to total 
cases) close to p. This assumption presupposes that for which action Alice agent-causally 
decides is not itself governed by the objective probability p. Because if this decision was 
governed by p, we would expect a ratio close to p even from the agent-causal perspective (due 
to the law of large numbers), such that finding indeed a ratio close to p could not work as an 
argument against agent-causation anymore (O’Connor 2003: 309; Bernáth/Tőzsér 2020: 52). 
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Accordingly, justifying the independence assumption in question is crucial for the success of 
Pereboom’s argument. How can it be justified? 
Pereboom’s (2005: 244-247) own response to the question why agent-causal decisions 
should be regarded as independent from objective probabilities is the following: Since agent-
causation is introduced in order to overcome the luck problem, “the causal power that the agent 
exercises in making a decision must be of a different sort from the causal powers of the 
antecedent events” (Pereboom 2005: 244, original italics). If the exercise of agent-causation 
was governed by the same probabilities that govern the event-causal proceedings, agent-
causation and event-causation would not be sufficiently distinct, and reference to agent-
causation could not be used in order to overcome the luck problem. 
But one might still wonder why. Why exactly does the distinctiveness of agent- and 
event-causation, which seems definitely necessary for a successful agent-causal approach to 
overcome the luck problem, require the absence of a common probabilistic structure? Couldn’t 
agent- and event-causation still be sufficiently distinct even if they were governed by the same 
probabilistic structure? As Randolph Clarke (2010: 396) notes, a free-will establishing “agent-
causal power might differ from an event-causal power in some respects while resembling it in 
others”. Couldn’t a common probabilistic structure belong to those respects in which agent- 
and event-causation are similar, while there are other differences that suffice to give a 
satisfactory agent-causal response to the luck problem (for example the aforementioned lack of 
“datability” of the irreducible agent)? It is not yet clear why, on Pereboom’s account, there must 
be the additional difference that the agent-cause is not subjected to the probabilistic structure 
of the event-causes. 
 
4. Bernáth and Tőzsér’s Rollback Argument 
A third rollback argument, which has recently been proposed by Lászlo Bernáth and János 
Tőzsér (2020: 48-55), is intended to fill this argumentative gap. The main idea is that, since 
rollback patterns can be completely explained with reference to free agent-causal decisions for 
each individual action, there is no explanatory role left that could be filled by postulating 
objective probabilities. Even if the agent-causal decisions themselves were governed by 
objective probabilities, the decision’s free and “non-chancy” (ibid.: 53) character itself would 
explain the overall pattern, such that the probabilities are not needed for the explanation of the 
pattern. Due to this explanatory dispensability, one should refrain from postulating the 
existence of objective probabilities for free actions in the first place.  
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One could say much more about why exactly there would be no explanatory role for the 
probabilities left, but for the development of my own argument these details are not important. 
This is because, although we argue for similar conclusions, Bernáth and Tőzsér’s rollback 
argument takes a very different approach to my own. Accordingly, I will only explain some 
general characteristics of Bernáth and Tőzsér’s argument, and motivate my own argument’s 
divergence from them. 
 Firstly, Bernáth and Tőzsér (2020: 55-56) claim superiority over Pereboom’s account 
because they aim to show that a co-occurrence of free will and exceptionless objective 
probabilities is “impossible” rather than merely “highly unlikely” (ibid.: 55). However, their 
argument relies on the premise that “[i]f ground floor probabilities of free action do not have 
explanatory role, one should reject the existence of these probabilities with regard to free 
action” (ibid.: 52, 54). Now it may indeed be good methodological advice not to assume the 
existence of something that doesn’t explain anything. However, this is not the same as claiming 
that something cannot exist just because its existence wouldn’t explain anything. Couldn’t it 
still be possible that the objective probabilities exist as harmless co-governors of free actions, 
without having their own explanatory relevance? 
What Bernáth and Tőzsér (2020: 53) aim to show is that the “introduction [of objective 
probabilities] to the metaphysical landscape of actions is empty”. In the terminology of Section 
2, this undermines the probability-establishing step of the rollback argument, which aims to 
justify the assignment of objective probabilities to free actions. But Bernáth and Tőzsér don’t 
establish that if there were objective probabilities, this would preclude free will, i.e. they don’t 
justify the freedom-undermining step of van Inwagen’s argument. But if one wants to argue for 
the incompatibility of free will and thoroughly probabilistic indeterminism, this freedom-
undermining inference is exactly what needs to be justified. 
Secondly, Bernáth and Tőzsér’s (2020: 58) investigation is restricted to free-will 
theories that regard “a complete lack of chanciness [as] a necessary condition of free action”. 
Only for those theories, it is argued that one should not postulate the exceptionless presence of 
objective probabilities. This way, Kane’s (1999) earlier sketched response to the luck problem, 
insisting that “chance” in a technical sense is not freedom-undermining in itself, becomes 
explicitly excluded from consideration (Bernáth/Tőzsér 2020: 47-48). Although this restriction 
of focus is perfectly legitimate, it doesn’t fit well with my own aim of showing that any 
successful response to the luck problem must require the absence of objective probabilities. 
Supporting this position requires a rejection of Kane’s response to the luck problem which is 
outside the scope of Bernáth and Tőzsér’s argument. Besides that, it is not perfectly clear what 
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exactly Bernáth and Tőzsér mean when they speak of “chance”. In order to avoid such problem, 
it would be desirable to have an argument that either doesn’t explicitly rely on the concept of 
“chance” at all or that gives it an unequivocal technical meaning. In my own argument, I 
equivocate “chance” with “thoroughly probabilistic indeterminism”, and it is intended to show 
how chance in this purely technical sense undermines free will. 
The main difference between Bernáth and Tőzsér’s and my own argument concerns the 
centrality of alternative possibilities. Bernáth and Tőzsér’s argument relies on the requirement 
of “dual control”, which presupposes alternative possibilities (Shabo 2011: 107), but the role 
of these alternative possibilities isn’t directly investigated. In my own argument, the 
relationship between thoroughly probabilistic indeterminism and the ability to act otherwise 
constitutes the focal point of interest. In Section 7, I will explain how this approach helps to 
avoid the discussed problems of van Inwagen’s, Pereboom’s and Bernáth and Tőzsér’s 
arguments. First, however, the proposed argument shall be presented. 
 
5. Rollbacks and the Ability to Act Otherwise 
The main idea behind my argument is that thoroughly probabilistic indeterminism undermines 
the kind of ability to act otherwise that is required for the exercise of free will, and that rollback 
scenarios are apt to illustrate this because they reveal the agent’s lacking control over the 
overarching composition of actions. 
 Before explaining this argument, let me first recapitulate the main argument for 
regarding free will as incompatible with determinism. Abstracting from all technical details, the 
main idea of this “Consequence Argument” is that if determinism holds, one cannot do 
otherwise because everything one does is strictly implied by natural laws and states of the world 
before one’s own birth. Since one cannot do otherwise with respect to any of these, the lacking 
ability to act otherwise with respect to laws and earlier states transfers to all of the agent’s later 
actions. If determinism holds, one cannot act otherwise with respect to any of one’s actions. 
Now the “Principle of Alternative Possibilities” is deployed, which says that being able to act 
otherwise is a necessary condition for free will. Acceptance of this principle and the 
Consequence Argument leads one to incompatibilism about free will and determinism (van 
Inwagen 1983: Ch.3; Speak 2011). 
Let’s shift from determinism to thoroughly probabilistic indeterminism. Does this 
change anything about whether the involved agents can act otherwise? In some sense, 
alternative possibilities appear to be compatible with thoroughly probabilistic indeterminism. 
For if there is a nonzero probability that Alice tells the truth and a nonzero probability that she 
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lies instead, whatever she finally does, it was possible that she did otherwise. However, it is 
unclear whether alternative possibilities in this basic sense are really the sort of alternative 
possibilities that the Principle of Alternative Possibilities requires for free will. Thus, the 
relevant question is not whether thoroughly probabilistic indeterminism is compatible with 
alternative possibilities in some sense (as it undeniably is), but whether it is compatible with 
the right kind of alternative possibilities. I will call the required right kind of having alternative 
possibilities, i.e. the strongest form of being able to act otherwise that is still a necessary 
condition for exercising free will, a free-will enabling ability to act otherwise. 
 There are intuition-based considerations to think that the probability-compatible ability 
to act otherwise is not free-will enabling. If there are objective probabilities for whether Alice 
lies or tells the truth, what seems possible is that it turns out differently how Alice decides and 
acts, but not that she herself controls which of these possibilities becomes actualized. One might 
even say that what is given is a mere possibility that Alice acts otherwise, but not her ability to 
do so in a controlled manner (Shabo 2014: 161-162). What seems required for free will, 
however, is the latter control rather than only the former possibility. This concern expresses the 
luck problem for (thoroughly probabilistic) indeterminism, since what one worries is that if 
Alice had acted otherwise, she wouldn’t have had control over the alternative action, but that 
she would have acted otherwise as a (mere) matter of luck (Kane 1999: 219-220).  
Robert Kane (1999: 236-239) tries to counter this luck objection by differentiating 
between two different kinds of control. While he admits that “antecedent determining control–
the ability to determine or guarantee which of a set of options will occur before it occurs” is not 
available on the event-causal libertarian account he favours, he still insists that another kind of 
control is possible even in a thoroughly probabilistic world.6 This available kind of control is 
“plural voluntary control over a set of options [which] means being able to bring about 
whichever of the options you will or most want, when you will to do so, for the reasons you 
will to do so, without being coerced or compelled in doing so” (Kane 1999: 237-238, italics in 
original). There is no reason for why this plural voluntary control should not be possible in a 
world of thoroughly probabilistic indeterminism. After all, as soon as a decision-concerning 
                                                        
6 Kane (1999) does not explicitly differentiate between thoroughly probabilistic and (partly) lawless 
indeterminism. Nonetheless, there are good reasons for interpreting him as claiming a compatibility between his 
own free will account and thoroughly probabilistic indeterminism. Firstly, he uses “quantum jumps” as paradigm 
examples of undetermined actions that can ground free will (Kane 1999: 219-220; 2011: 386), and quantum jumps 
are traditionally regarded as governed by objective probabilities. Secondly, he explicitly rejects the introduction 
of “extra factors” like Cartesian souls or irreducible agent causes (Kane 1999: 223; 2011: 386), arguably in order 
to avoid unscientific metaphysical commitments. Against this background, it would seem surprising if Kane 
committed himself to exceptions in the probabilistic scientific structure of the world. (Moreover, a commitment to 
partly lawless indeterminism seems to be of no use if there is no “extra factor” that utilizes that lack of structure 
to which partly lawless indeterminism gives rise. I will return to this point in the Conclusion.) 
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indeterminacy is settled, what the agent wants is also settled. In each case, she might very well 
be able to successfully act on that will, without coercion or other obstacles being in place. Now, 
if this probability-compatible plural voluntary control is all that is required for free will, it 
doesn’t matter anymore whether the luck objection shows the more demanding antecedent 
determining control to be undermined in thoroughly probabilistic contexts. 
How should we evaluate the control-concerning luck problem in light of this response 
by Kane? Of course, one might argue about whether antecedent determining control is really 
dispensable for free will. But the problem is that the above sketched form of the luck objection 
seems incapable of directly addressing this question. Once more, an intuitively plausible luck 
objection turns out to be too primitive to deal with Kane’s (1999) sophisticated distinctions. 
My rollback argument is intended to circumvent this shortcoming. Since the argument 
finally rejects the idea that free actions could be governed by all-encompassing objective 
probabilities, it implicates, just like the sketched luck objections, that undetermined actions in 
a world of thoroughly probabilistic indeterminism are merely a matter of luck. The crucial 
difference, however, is that my proposed rollback argument does not regard this implicated luck 
proposition as independently plausible, but rather derives it from further considerations. 
Crucially, in doing so the argument does not rely on those intuitions which make the earlier 
presented luck objections vulnerable to Kane’s distinctions. In Section 8, I will return to how 
exactly my rollback argument deals with these distinctions. First, however, a detailed 
presentation of the argument is in order. 
As noted, if there is an objective non-extreme probability at t1 for whether Alice tells 
the truth or lies, she is able to act otherwise, in the basic sense of it being possible that she acts 
otherwise. We do not know yet whether this ability to act otherwise is the free-will enabling 
ability to act otherwise that we are searching for, but we know that it is given for each individual 
rollback instance. What happens with this ability if we consider the whole sequence of Alice’s 
decisions? Because of the law of large numbers, we can reliably predict that the relative 
frequency of ‘truth’ to total cases will converge to the objective probability of her telling the 
truth, as the number of rollbacks increases. In rough analogy to the Consequence Argument, it 
appears that Alice cannot (directly7) act otherwise with respect to this relative frequency, 
                                                        
7 What is the meaning and argumentative role of this “directly”? Without it, one might object here and point to a 
relevant disanalogy to the Consequence Argument. After all, the state at t1 is temporally located directly before 
Alice’s decision and not before her own birth (as the determining state on which one focusses in the Consequence 
Argument). So, couldn’t Alice still have had an indirect alternative to her rollback composition, by means of 
having had an alternative to the state at t1? Let’s grant, for the sake of the objection, that this is true. However, 
what we are interested in is whether Alice’s deciding to tell the truth or to lie is a directly free action, i.e. an action 
that establishes her free will rather than merely transferring it from earlier freedom (see footnote 1). For direct 
freedom to be possible, according to the main idea of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, there has to be an 
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because the frequency is reliably predicted (with a precision that approaches to perfection as 
the number of rollbacks increases) by the laws and the state at t1, both of which are already 
given. Whereas she appears able to act otherwise (in a certain sense) with respect to each 
individual decision, this ability (in the very same sense) seems to diminish if we shift our 
perspective from the individual action to the whole rollback sequence of actions (cf. Frederick 
2013: 70). 
This might seem intuitively freedom-threatening, but without further elaboration it 
doesn’t show much yet. There can be properties which are given for each individual part of a 
system but not for the system as a whole. Consider for example the radioactive decay of an 
element. For each individual atom, it’s undetermined (with a probability of 0.5) whether it will 
decay in the next half-value period. However, on the macroscopic level of the substance, it is 
not (relevantly) undetermined what happens: After one half-value period, there will be, pretty 
much exactly, half of the original amount left. The indeterminacies “wash out” if one switches 
perspective from the particle- to the macroscopic level. Each individual atom has a 0.5 
probability of decaying, but it would be wrong to say the same about the whole substance. (The 
element is almost certain to decay to 50 per cent of its former amount, but this property is clearly 
not the same as the property of having a 0.5 probability of completely decaying.) Still, the fact 
that the whole doesn’t have the property that each of its parts has, doesn’t change anything 
about the parts having this property. Similarly, the fact that there is no ability to act otherwise 
in respect of the whole rollback composition need not change anything about this ability (in the 
sense under consideration) being given for the individual actions. What is the problem then? 
Some properties transfer from parts to whole, others don’t. The ability to act otherwise 
that is under consideration here apparently doesn’t. Why is that supposed to be a problem? 
Remember that, in light of the luck problem, we were not sure whether the ability to act 
                                                        
ability to act otherwise in the direct context of the respective action (Frederick 2013: 67-68). If this requirement 
for a directly free action is satisfied, i.e. if at the time of (or directly before) one’s action one still has an alternative 
to it, I will speak of a direct ability to act otherwise. This direct ability to act otherwise seems not given for the 
overall rollback composition, because the already given state at t1 and the fixed laws predict this rollback 
composition with a reliability that approaches to certainty.  
In what follows, when discussing the ability to act otherwise, I always mean a direct ability to act otherwise. One 
might object that requiring direct abilities to act otherwise for free will (as I will do in the third premise of my 
main argument) is more demanding than merely requiring a direct or indirect ability to act otherwise, and that my 
use of language thus hides a significant commitment of my argument. But explicitly stating the direct character of 
the required ability to act otherwise wouldn’t make the respective premise (or anything else in my argument) any 
less convincing. For if an indirect ability to act otherwise is given, this still requires a direct ability to act otherwise 
at some other place. If I succeed in showing that thoroughly probabilistic indeterminism undermines the direct 
ability to act otherwise, it also undermines the indirect ability to act otherwise, and thus free will. So, if the direct 
or indirect ability to act otherwise is necessary for free will, then so is a direct ability to act otherwise. (Admittedly, 
demanding a direct ability to act otherwise regarding a particular action for the freedom of this particular action 
would be too strong. But I don’t demand this, neither explicitly nor implicitly.) 
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otherwise under consideration is really the free-will enabling ability that we are searching for. 
I suggest that we found a reason for this scepticism, a reason to regard the probability-
compatible ability to act otherwise as inferior to some further ability to act otherwise that is 
also necessary for free will. Let me try to elaborate this. I suggest that if one accepts the 
Principle of Alternative Possibilities, one should also accept the following principle (cf. 
Bernáth/Tőzsér 2020: 49): 
Principle of Alternatives-Transfer (unrevised): If one has the strongest ability to act 
otherwise that still constitutes a necessary condition for exercising free will, then this 
ability transfers (and would transfer) from individual actions to any overall composition 
of actions, if all of the composition-constituting actions have that ability (by the same 
person). 
Why is this principle plausible? For an example, suppose you are designing a picture-
file. The file consists of many pixels, the colour of each of which you can decide for in a free 
manner. You freely decide for a certain colour and you could have chosen any other colour as 
well. This holds not just for the first, but for every pixel. What about the resulting picture? The 
picture is nothing but the result of many of your free choices. Since you were able to decide for 
a different colour in respect of every individual pixel, you were also able to create a radically 
different colour composition as well, for example a composition that involves way less of the 
colour that dominates the picture. Your abilities to act otherwise with respect to every individual 
pixel transfer to the whole composition, since the composition is just the result of many of your 
colour-choices, each of which you could have made differently. 
Now suppose someone claims that your decision regarding each individual pixel was 
free because you could have decided otherwise for each of them, but that you could still not 
have arranged a strongly diverging overall composition of pixels. Can you make sense of this 
claim? Remember that the overall composition is merely the result of all your free pixel-choices 
that you could have made differently. If you should finally come to accept that you could not 
have chosen otherwise with respect to the overall composition, how can you still believe that 
you were able to act otherwise regarding each of the individual pixels in a free-will enabling 
manner?  
Now we can finally formulate our rollback argument concerning the ability to act 
otherwise. We can argue that the ability to act otherwise that is possible in a world of thoroughly 
probabilistic indeterminism is not the free-will enabling ability to act otherwise that we are 
searching for. For if this adequate ability to act otherwise was given, one would need to have 
an ability to act otherwise even regarding the overall composition in the rollback scenario. But 
thoroughly probabilistic indeterminism undermines the ability to act otherwise regarding this 
overall composition, because the relevant relative frequency is reliably fixed by the laws and 
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the probability p. Accordingly, thoroughly probabilistic indeterminism also undermines the 
free-will enabling ability to act otherwise in each individual instance. This ability, which is 
necessary for free will, is incompatible with thoroughly probabilistic indeterminism, and so is 
free will itself. 
Before further expounding upon this argument, it will be helpful to give a more explicit 
version of it: 
(P1) If thoroughly probabilistic indeterminism holds, then there is an objective 
probability for every performed action. 
(P2) If there is an objective probability for an action, then the following 
counterfactual holds: If there was a long-run rollback scenario, then there 
would be no ability to act otherwise regarding the overall composition of 
actions. 
(P3) Free will requires the ability to act otherwise (in a free-will enabling sense). 
(P4) If a free-will enabling ability to act otherwise is given for an individual action, 
then the counterfactual holds that it would also be given for the overall 
composition of actions if there was a long-run rollback scenario. 
(C) If thoroughly probabilistic indeterminism holds, there is no free will. 
(P1) follows from the definition of thoroughly probabilistic indeterminism. (P2) follows from 
the law of large numbers and the assumption that one lacks the ability to act otherwise regarding 
an overall composition of actions if the composition’s basic ratio is highly reliably predicted 
by laws and earlier fixed states. (P3) states the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, with the 
parenthesised reminder that certain weak abilities to act otherwise might not be enough. What 
is required is an ability to act otherwise in the strongest sense that still constitutes a necessary 
condition for free will. But since the content of this sense is not specified yet, (P3) states nothing 
more substantial than that some ability to act otherwise is required (namely the appropriate free-
will enabling one). (P4) is just the application of the Principle of Alternatives-Transfer to the 
rollback scenario in question. The conclusion (C) is what we are searching for: If the world is 
governed by thoroughly probabilistic indeterminism, there is no free will.8 In the next sections, 
I will discuss possible objections to this argument. 
 
6. Discussion of Possible Objections 
Many objections against rollback arguments in general state that rollbacks are not actually 
existent (Clarke 2010: 391, 393) or not even metaphysically possible (Franklin 2012: 406-407). 
Note, however, that arguments regarding the actual non-existence of rollbacks are not 
                                                        
8 Supplementing a necessity operator on every premise and on the conclusion would deliver an argument for 
incompatibilism (in the classical modal sense) about free will and thoroughly probabilistic indeterminism. As far 
as I can see, there is no obstacle to adapting the argument in this way because the argument doesn’t rely on any 
contingent features of the world. 
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applicable to my argument because both (P2) and (P4) involve counterfactuals, stating what 
would happen if there was a rollback situation. Saying something substantial with those 
counterfactuals clearly doesn’t require the actual reality of rollbacks, but only their 
metaphysical possibility. As Bernáth and Tőzsér (2020: 55) explain in more detail, arguments 
which deny the metaphysical possibility of rollbacks can usually be escaped by innocent 
changes in the illustration of the scenario (at least as long as one doesn’t regard the concept of 
a long instance of actions with identical initial conditions itself as metaphysically suspicious). 
In this discussion section, I focus on two possible objections that specifically concern my 
proposed version of the rollback argument regarding the ability to act otherwise. 
 
6.1 Lacking Alternative Possibilities Regarding the Rollback Composition  
Concerning (P2), one might critically ask whether the ability to act otherwise regarding the 
overall rollback ratio of ‘truth’ to total cases would really be lacking. After all, given a fixed 
probability p at t1, it is not strictly impossible that the overall ratio significantly departs from p, 
but it is merely extremely unlikely. Thus, if we rely on an undemanding sense of being able to 
act otherwise, according to which being able to act otherwise basically involves the possibility 
that the agent acts otherwise, shouldn’t we grant this ability also in respect of the overall 
composition? 
 The answer depends once more on how exactly we understand “ability”. I admit that 
there might be an extremely liberal interpretation of “being able to act otherwise” for which 
any given possibility is considered. But I contend that such an “ability” is no serious contender 
for the free-will enabling ability to act otherwise, even if one regards noteworthy possibilities 
that one acts otherwise as sufficient for a free-will enabling ability to act otherwise. This is 
because it is unavoidable to disregard tiniest probabilities, even in areas apart from free will. 
Consider again the case of the radioactive element’s decay, where every single atom has 
a 0.5 chance of decaying in the next half-value period. After this period, there will be half of 
the element’s original amount on the macroscopic level left. Although this is highly reasonable 
to expect and to rely on, it is not completely certain. There is a nonzero probability that no atom 
will decay or that every atom will decay, even if the probabilities for these unexpected events 
are extremely low. Maybe even more illustrating, there are extremely small nonzero 
probabilities for even stranger events of a quantum-physical kind, like macroscopic objects 
spontaneously disappearing and reappearing somewhere distant. Despite their nonzero 
probabilities, it seems unreasonable to take those possibilities serious (Almeida/Bernstein 2011: 
487-488). If the probability of one’s acting otherwise is as small as the probabilities for such 
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bizarre quantum-physical events, it would be absurd to regard the respective possibility as free-
will enabling, even if one believes that larger probabilities that one acts otherwise can be free-
will enabling.  
So, what is needed is a nonzero threshold-probability, such that probabilities of acting 
otherwise which fall below this threshold can be neglected. Similarly, we need a measure that 
tells us which overall ratios (e.g. of ‘truth’ to total cases) should be regarded as relevantly 
different from the predicted one. If the objective probability point-predicts an overall ratio of 
0.32, and it turns out to be possible that it is 0.31999 instead, this would arguably not suffice to 
constitute a relevant alternative possibility. We should define a tolerance interval around the 
point-predicted ratio, such that only ratios outside of it are regarded as relevantly different. And 
now the law of large numbers tells us that however low we set the (nonzero) threshold 
probability and however small we set the (extended) tolerance interval, finding a ratio outside 
the tolerance interval will have a probability below the threshold probability, if the rollback 
sequence only gets long enough. Therefore, there is no relevant ability to act otherwise 
regarding the overall ratio in long-run rollback scenarios. 
But, one might insist, even if there is no ability to act otherwise regarding the relevant 
ratios, couldn’t one still have an ability to act otherwise regarding the overall composition, in 
the sense of the relevant pattern? Let’s get back to the example of designing a picture file. Even 
if you have no choice about the ratio of, say, black to blue pixels, aren’t there still several 
possibilities concerning the pattern which these pixels compose? Even if the possibility of such 
a relevantly different pattern is admitted, I do not think that this seriously threatens my 
argument. For if there is a free-will enabling ability to act otherwise regarding each individual 
action, the Principle of Alternatives-Transfer should let us expect not only an ability to act 
otherwise regarding the resulting pattern, but also regarding the relevant relative frequencies. 
We can therefore stipulate that “composition” only refers to the relevant ratios, without the 
Principle of Alternatives-Transfer thereby losing plausibility. Thus, (P2) seems capable of 
withstanding the objections discussed in this section. If thoroughly probabilistic indeterminism 
holds, there would be no noteworthy ability to act otherwise regarding the overall composition 
of actions in a long-run rollback scenario. 
 
6.2 Questioning the Principle of Alternatives-Transfer 
However, the last objection leads to a more serious problem. If one can hold the ratio of ‘truth’ 
to total cases fixed, and could still have different patterns of actions, this implies that the pattern-
relevant individual actions could be different, while the overall ratio is held fixed. Doesn’t this 
 19 
give rise to counterexamples to the Principle of Alternatives-Transfer? Randolph Clarke (2010: 
390-391) sketches a situation in which one can choose one hundred times between pushing a 
red button and pushing a blue button, while one complies to the requirement of having a final 
composition of 60 red-button pushes to 40 blue-button pushes. In this case, one cannot act 
otherwise with respect to the overall relative frequencies, but apparently this doesn’t undermine 
one’s ability to choose and act otherwise in each individual case. Accordingly, there is an ability 
to act otherwise regarding the individual actions, but not regarding the overall pattern. For 
another example, consider again the artist who designs a picture-file by deciding about the 
colour of each individual pixel. Let’s assume that he has a compulsive disorder that forces him 
to only paint pictures that consist of 90% black pixels and 10% red pixels, such that he cannot 
act otherwise regarding this overall ratio. Still, he might be able to construct very different 
motifs, depending on where exactly the red pixels are. This compulsively disordered artist is 
able to act otherwise regarding any individual pixel, but not regarding the overall relative 
frequency. Thus, the Principle of Alternatives-Transfer, despite its initial plausibility, seems 
wrong. 
 I admit that these cases do indeed constitute counterexamples to the unrevised version 
of the Principle of Alternatives-Transfer. However, a slight amendment of the principle will 
suffice in order to deal with them. This is because the counterexamples differ from the rollback 
scenario in one important respect: In both Clarke’s button-pressing example and in the case of 
the compulsively disordered artist, there is a constraint on the overall pattern that does not 
originate in the characteristics of the individual actions. The externality of the constraining 
influence makes it possible that the restrictions on the ability to act otherwise only concern 
(some aspects of) the overall pattern, but not (or only to a limited extent) the constituting 
individual actions. The rollback case, however, is not externally constrained in any relevant 
way. All features of the overall composition in rollback scenarios can be entirely traced back 
to the characteristics of the individual actions. It is this absence of external constraints (and thus 
the exclusive influence of internal characteristics) which allows us to trace back the lack of an 
ability to act otherwise regarding the overall composition to a free-will deficiency in the 
individual actions (cf. Bernáth/Tőzsér 2020: 45-46). This is not possible in the counterexamples 
because as soon as there are external constraints, we do not know whether to trace back the 
lacking composition-concerning ability to act otherwise to the external constraint or whether to 
trace it back to features of the individual actions. The Principle of Alternatives-Transfer has 
thus to be revised, such that the absence of external influences on the overall pattern is explicitly 
required: 
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Principle of Alternatives-Transfer (revised): If one has the strongest ability to act 
otherwise that still constitutes a necessary condition for exercising free will, then this 
ability transfers (and would transfer) from individual actions to any overall composition 
of actions, if all of the composition-constituting actions have that ability (by the same 
person) and given that all relevant characteristics of the overall composition have their 
origin entirely in characteristics of the individual actions. 
The added presupposition makes the principle immune to the discussed counterexamples, while 
still leaving it applicable the rollback scenarios under consideration. Thus, given that (P4) is 
just the result of applying the principle to such a rollback scenario, no amendment of (P4) is 
required. 
 
7. Earlier Criticisms Avoided 
The proposed rollback argument was supposed to overcome the earlier identified problems in 
van Inwagen’s, Pereboom’s and Bernáth and Tőzsér’s rollback arguments. It shall now be 
investigated whether it succeeds in doing so. Regarding van Inwagen’s argument, it was 
criticised, firstly, that the inference from an action’s being governed by objective probability to 
that action’s being a matter of chance in a freedom-undermining sense lacks motivation. 
Secondly, Buchak (2013) criticised that the probability-establishing step involves circularity. 
The proposed argument avoids both of these criticisms, because the problematic probability-
establishing step is eliminated altogether, and the freedom-undermining step is supported by 
showing how objective probabilities undermine the free-will enabling ability to act otherwise. 
 Pereboom’s argument faces two different criticisms. Firstly, the most it can show is that 
the existence of agent-causation is unlikely in a thoroughly probabilistic world, but it cannot 
show that thoroughly probabilistic indeterminism and agent-causation exclude each other. 
Secondly, it claims that agent-causation must be independent from the event-causal 
probabilistic structure, but it doesn’t deliver a satisfactory argument for this claim. Moreover, 
it doesn’t explicate the luck problem, but merely intends to show that agent-causation as a 
possible solution to it is not likely to be present. (This last point is not really an objection against 
Pereboom’s argument, but rather a restriction of it.) 
 My proposed argument avoids these criticisms and restrictions. It aims to show that 
every account of free will that claims compatibility with thoroughly probabilistic indeterminism 
cannot give a free-will enabling account of the agent’s ability to act otherwise. It also provides 
a reason for why agent- and event-causation cannot be governed by a common probabilistic 
structure, though its answer differs from Pereboom’s. (While Pereboom claims that agent- and 
event-causation would not be sufficiently distinct anymore if they were governed by the same 
probabilistic laws, the present argument explains why the agent’s free decisions must not be 
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governed by any all-encompassing probabilistic laws at all, be they dependent or independent 
from the event-causal level.) Moreover, the argument’s logical character, as recognisable in the 
formalization at the end of Section 5, is deductive. It shows not only that free will and objective 
probabilities are highly unlikely to cooccur, but that they are incompatible. 
My argument also exceeds Bernáth and Tőzsér’s argument in the respects motivated in 
Section 4. It doesn’t only argue for the lacking explanatory motivation to posit objective 
probabilities for free actions, but it shows that if an action is governed by objective probabilities, 
it must lack a free-will enabling ability to act otherwise. The concept of “chance” that threatens 
free will is technically defined as an action’s being governed by objective probabilities, such 
that no hidden responsibility-undermining or otherwise unclear associations are involved. If 
one only discusses thoroughly probabilistic indeterminism directly, one can even eliminate the 
concept of “chance” from the argument altogether. This is also what gives the argument its 
potential to deal with Robert Kane’s event-causal responses to the luck problem. 
 
8. Strengthening the Luck Objection 
The first mentioned response of Kane (1999) is to differentiate between the meaning of 
“chance” or “luck” in the technical sense of indeterminism, and these terms’ responsibility-
undermining associations in common language, corresponding to something’s being merely a 
matter of “chance” or “luck”. Kane claims that even free-will establishing actions can be a 
matter of “chance” or “luck” in the technical sense, as long as they satisfy further conditions, 
such that they are not merely a matter of chance. The proposed rollback argument, however, 
can deal with this reply. This is because it shows that what undermines free will are not (only) 
the associations of “chance” or “luck” in common language, but rather the technical concept of 
indeterminism itself (at least as long as the indeterminism in question is a thoroughly 
probabilistic indeterminism, as it is under consideration here). In arguing that thoroughly 
probabilistic indeterminism undermines the free-will enabling ability to act otherwise, it was 
not necessary to rely on the freedom-undermining associations of something being merely a 
matter of chance. Instead, the purely technical concept of thoroughly probabilistic 
indeterminism sufficed to show that the composition-concerning ability to act otherwise is 
lacking.  
 Kane’s (1999) second response, addressing the claim that undetermined actions were 
not under their respective agent’s control, involves his differentiation between “antecedent 
determining control” and “plural voluntary control”. He insists that plural voluntary control is 
all that is required in terms of free-will relevant control, whereas antecedent determining control 
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is dispensable. The problem of intuition-based luck objections is that they lack the resources to 
adequately answer this response. But I suggest that my rollback argument can be deployed for 
a promising approach to reject Kane’s response. 
Consider again the definition of plural voluntary control as “being able to bring about 
whichever of the options you will or most want, when you will to do so, for the reasons you 
will to do so, without being coerced or compelled in doing so” (Kane 1999: 237-238, without 
italics). Now remember that Kane is a libertarian and as such he beliefs that there is no free will 
in deterministic worlds, although there can be free will in indeterministic worlds. Accordingly, 
whatever specific account of free will Kane endorses, he should be able to explain this account’s 
superiority to those kinds of alleged compatibilist freedom that can also be given in 
deterministic worlds.  
Kane’s account of plural voluntary control, however, bears remarkable resemblance to 
compatibilist accounts of free will. Its central elements–being able to do what one most wants 
to do, acting on the basis of reasons, the absence of coercion and compulsion–can all be satisfied 
in deterministic worlds and feature in fact in many compatibilist free-will accounts. The 
apparently only control-relevant feature that distinguishes Kane’s account from a compatibilist 
account that also requires these elements is that on Kane’s account the conditions must be 
fulfilled for a whole set of concurring possible actions, rather than for only one predetermined 
action. In other words, what is crucial for his account are the alternative possibilities, the 
plurality of the plural voluntary control that indeterminism allows for. Without these alternative 
possibilities, it would not be clear in which way Kane’s account is supposed to be superior to a 
merely compatibilist account of free will. Therefore, the acceptability of Kane’s account of 
control (at least for incompatibilists) seems to hinge on the freedom-relevance of the alternative 
possibilities that his account allows for. 
The rollback argument presented here, however, is supposed to show that those 
alternative possibilities which can be given in a world of thoroughly probabilistic 
indeterminism are not free-will enabling. As far as I can see, it does so without presupposing 
the requirement for antecedent determining control that Kane challenges. Accordingly, if there 
is no free-will enabling ability to act otherwise in a world of thoroughly probabilistic 
indeterminism, then there seems to be also no free-will enabling difference between Kane’s 
account of plural voluntary control and compatibilist accounts of control.9 Although this might 
                                                        
9 Kane (2011) might try to escape this argument by claiming that his account differs from compatibilist accounts 
by allowing for agents’ ultimate sourcehood. I do not deny this difference, but I deny its relevance for the 
investigation under consideration. For what is at stake here is the status of plural voluntary control. Control over 
one’s actions, however, seems to depend on ultimate sourcehood only insofar as ultimate sourcehood allows for 
control over the open alternative possibilities. But the above considerations show that alternative possibilities in a 
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only be a rough sketch of an argument against Kane’s response to the luck problem, it still 
illustrates that the proposed rollback argument offers resources to argue against Kane’s 
responses which more intuition-based versions of the luck objection lack. 
 
9. Concluding Remarks 
In the preceding sections, I developed and defended an argument for the incompatibility of free 
will and thoroughly probabilistic indeterminism which focusses on the undermining of the free-
will enabling ability to act otherwise by objectives probabilities, and on how this undermining 
can be recognised by considering counterfactual rollback scenarios. In this concluding section, 
I want to focus on the consequences that this result yields for the general tenability of 
libertarianism. 
 As mentioned in the Introduction, libertarians have to explain how free will can be 
existent in an indeterministic world. The main thesis of this paper is that, in order to be 
successful with that task, they have to reject thoroughly probabilistic indeterminism. Until now, 
I supported this claim by arguing that if one commits to thoroughly probabilistic indeterminism, 
one cannot give a satisfactory account of free will. What has not been investigated, however, 
is how libertarians can account for the existence of free will if they rely on (partly) lawless 
indeterminism instead. 
 In Section 7, I sketched an argument for the insufficiency of Robert Kane’s event-causal 
response to the luck problem in a context of thoroughly probabilistic indeterminism. Will such 
an event-causal response fare better if it is brought about in a context of (partly) lawless 
indeterminism? What has to be admitted is that my objections against this response do not work 
anymore as soon as all-encompassing probabilities are eliminated. This is because my 
objections rely on the undermining of any (noteworthy) ability to act otherwise regarding 
overall compositions, and this undermining doesn’t work without objective probabilities that 
fix the overall composition in rollback scenarios. However, this fixing was intended to show, 
by means of the Principle of Alternatives-Transfer, that in a world of thoroughly probabilistic 
indeterminism there is no free-will enabling ability to act otherwise for the individual actions, 
such that what finally happens is arbitrary in a free-will undermining sense. It is hard to see 
how, if there is no such ability in a world of thoroughly probabilistic indeterminism, one can 
facilitate this ability by merely removing the structuring objective probabilities. How could this 
                                                        
world of thoroughly probabilistic indeterminism are not free-will enabling, so plural voluntary control in a world 
of thoroughly probabilistic indeterminism doesn’t have a free-will enabling advantage over compatibilist forms of 
control either. This is not to deny that there might be a relevance of ultimate sourcehood that exceeds the relevance 
of alternative possibilities. I merely claim that if such an independent relevance is given, it seems to have no 
bearing on control and is thus not relevant to the present considerations. 
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diminish the arbitrariness which undermines the freedom of individual actions in a context of 
thoroughly probabilistic indeterminism? How could it make plural voluntary control any more 
superior to compatibilist forms of control than it is in a thoroughly probabilistic world? 
Although I cannot deliver a fool-proof argument for this claim, I appears to me that if an event-
causal response to the luck problem fails in a world of thoroughly probabilistic indeterminism, 
it also fails in a world of (partly) lawless indeterminism (cf. Furlong 2017: 522, 528). 
 This looks different for an agent-causal approach. We have seen that if the agent-causal 
decisions (or its event-level effects) are completely governed by objective probabilities, this 
undermines the agent’s free-will enabling ability to act otherwise. But in contrast to the event-
causal case, it is not mysterious at all how removing this probabilistic structure can enhance 
freedom. In the event-causal case, there is nothing over and above states and events, such that 
removing the probabilistic structure of events and states doesn’t seem to enhance anyone’s 
freedom. But on the agent-causal account there is an irreducible agent whose free-will enabling 
ability to act otherwise is constrained by the problematic probabilistic structure. If this structure 
is removed, the agent can exercise his free-will establishing influence (described at the 
beginning of Section 3) in a less constrained way, such that the formerly missing free-will 
enabling ability to act otherwise can be given. The irreducible agent can thus be free to 
determine, in a manner unconstrained by objective probabilities, which of the possibilities that 
are left open by earlier states becomes finally actualized (cf. Furlong 2017: 523-525). 
 It is by means of these considerations that the proposed rollback argument does not only 
show how thoroughly probabilistic indeterminism undermines the credibility of event-causal 
free will accounts, but that it also motivates how a more satisfactory agent-causal account of 
free will might be given for a world of (partly) lawless indeterminism. Of course, the 
commitment to (partly) lawless indeterminism itself might seem demanding (Shabo 2014: 166, 
ftn.15; Schlosser 2017; Furlong 2017) and I did not discuss its acceptability here. What I 
intended to show is that this commitment is necessary if one wants to allow for the existence of 
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